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WHEN INDUSTRY KNOCKS: OHIO DEPARTMENT 
OF AGRICULTURE’S FIGHT TO CONTROL 
POLLUTION PERMITS FOR CONCENTRATED 
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 
ALEXIS WOODWORTH* 
ABSTRACT 
The Clean Water Act requires that a permit be obtained before discharging 
pollutants into bodies of water in the United States. In Ohio, these permits are issued 
by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. But in 2002, after growing pressure 
from agriculture lobbyists, the Ohio Legislature passed legislation to transfer 
permitting authority over industrial farms to the Ohio Department of Agriculture. To 
date, this transfer has not been approved by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency. The U.S. EPA has demanded legislative and regulatory changes 
before it will grant the Ohio Department of Agriculture permitting authority. 
Concerned citizens and organizations have urged the U.S. EPA to deny the transfer, 
citing the Ohio Department of Agriculture’s enforcement failures and the cozy 
relationship the agency has with the agricultural industry. Granting the Ohio 
Department of Agriculture permitting authority over industrial farms would create 
legislative, regulatory, and public interest conflicts. Further, it would take permitting 
authority away from the Ohio EPA, an agency already suitably regulating industrial 
farms under the Clean Water Act. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2014, Toledo, Ohio made national news when half a million residents 
lost drinking water for three days.1 Municipal officials instructed residents not to use 
the water for drinking, brushing teeth, or preparing food, and warned them that boiling 
the water would not make it safe.2 Governor John Kasich declared a state of 
emergency, calling for the Ohio National Guard and state workers to transport safe 
water to residents.3 With no certainty as to when the ban may be lifted, many residents 
resorted to waiting in lines at fire stations for bottled water.4 Some drove to Michigan 
to find stores that had supplies of bottled water after local shops ran out.5 Randy Nissen 
had driven to a friend’s home outside of the ban zone to fill every container he could 
with potable water.6 The New York Times interviewed Nissen a day before the ban was 
lifted.7 Nissen expressed a concern that, in retrospect, utterly eclipses the temporary 
panic of the ban: “I’m worried that when the water comes back on, everything will go 
back to the status quo, and no one will address the problems that caused this.”8 Mr. 
Nissen’s fear was far from undue.9 
                                                          
 1  George Tanber, Toxin Leaves 500,000 in Northwest Ohio Without Drinking Water, 
REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-water-ohio/toxin-leaves-
500000-in-northwest-ohio-without-drinking-water-idUSKBN0G20L120140802. 
 2  Alexandra Sifferlin, Toledo’s Contaminated Water: Here’s What Went Wrong, TIME 
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3079516/toledos-contaminated-water-heres-what-went-
wrong/; Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tap Water Ban for Toledo Residents, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/us/toledo-faces-second-day-of-water-ban.html. 
 3  Tanber, supra note 1. 
 4  Fitzsimmons, supra note 2. 
 5  Tanber, supra note 1; Fitzsimmons, supra note 2. 
 6  Fitzsimmons, supra note 2. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id. 
 9  See James F. McCarty, Harmful Algal Blooms Continue to Plague Lake Erie, Threaten 
Drinking Water, Fish, Pets, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 30, 2017), 
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The drinking water crisis Toledo experienced that summer was the result of a 
harmful algal bloom that had grown near the city’s water intake system in the Maumee 
Bay of Lake Erie.10 The algae contained a neurotoxin called microcystin, which can 
cause illness or death in humans and animals.11 Toledo Mayor D. Michael Collin lifted 
the municipal ban on drinking water after three days,12 “but experts say harmful algal 
blooms that can turn tap water toxic and kill wildlife are becoming more common in 
coastal oceans and in freshwater across the United States and around the globe.”13 
The harmful algal bloom in the Maumee Bay is one of many to have affected Lake 
Erie in recent years.14 In 2011, a then record-breaking harmful algal bloom reached 
from Toledo to Cleveland.15 In 2015, an even larger bloom covered an area the size of 
New York City.16 The growing concern for harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie 
represents a crisis occurring on a much larger scale.17 Harmful algal blooms appear to 
be increasing in frequency,18 with scientists pointing to climate change and fertilizer 
                                                          
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/08/harmful_algal_blooms_continue.html 
(“Over the past decade, blue-green algal blooms, which sometimes turn toxic, have become an 
annual summer plague on Lake Erie.”); Greta Jochem, Algae Toxins in Drinking Water Sickened 
People in Two Outbreaks, NPR (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2017/11/09/563073022/algae-contaminates-drinking-water (“In the summer of 2017, 
blooms in [Lake Erie] were the third-largest ever recorded.”). 
 10  Sifferlin, supra note 2. 
 11  Kenneth Kilbert et al., Tools for Reducing Harmful Algal Blooms in Lake Erie, 44 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 69 (2012); Harmful Algae, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INST., 
http://www.whoi.edu/redtide/home (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). For more information, see 
generally Taxonomic Reference List of Harmful Micro Algae, IOC-UNESCO, 
http://www.marinespecies.org/hab/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 12  See Jane J. Lee, Driven by Climate Change, Algae Blooms Behind Ohio Water Scare Are 
New Normal, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140804-harmful-algal-bloom-lake-erie-
climate-change-science/; Sifferlin, supra note 2. 
 13  Lee, supra note 12. 
 14  See Scott Surovjak, Combatting Harmful Algal Blooms and Saving America’s 
Waterways, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 1 (2017). 
 15  Jim Erickson, Record-Breaking 2011 Lake Erie Algae Bloom May Be Sign of Things to 
Come, MICH. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21342-record-
breaking-2011-lake-erie-algae-bloom-may-be-sign-of-things-to-come. 
 16  James F. McCarty, Lake Erie Algal Bloom of Summer of 2015 Was a Record-Breaker, 
Scientists Say, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/11/lake_erie_algal_bloom_of_summe.html. 
 17  See JENNIFER L. GRAHAM ET AL., CYANOBACTERIAL HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS AND U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENCE CAPABILITIES 2–3 (U.S. Geological Survey 2016) (providing a 
United States map showing areas affected by harmful algal blooms and discussing the growing 
problem of harmful algal blooms); see also Distribution of HABs in the U.S., WOODS HOLE 
OCEANOGRAPHIC INST., http://www.whoi.edu/redtide/regions/us-distribution (last updated Aug. 
15, 2016). 
 18  Lee, supra note 12; see also Harmful Algal Blooms: Tiny Organisms with a Toxic Punch, 
NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/hazards/hab/welcome.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2017) (“HABs have been reported in every U.S. coastal state, and their occurrence 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
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runoff as major causes.19 Studies indicate that harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie form 
“due to a combination of warm temperatures and excess nutrients, especially 
phosphorus.”20 Increased levels of phosphorus and other nutrients in natural 
environments due to human activity is often referred to as “nutrient loading.”21 
Research suggests a main source of phosphorus loading into Lake Erie is waste from 
industrial farms, known as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”).22 
CAFOs, sometimes called factory farms,23 are not synonymous with what one 
might envision when imagining a farm. Generally defined, a CAFO is an animal 
feeding operation with over 1,000 animal units.24 CAFOs are subject to regulation by 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”) under the Clean 
Water Act.25 
The Clean Water Act requires that a permit be obtained before discharging 
pollutants, including phosphorus from CAFO waste, into bodies of water.26 In Ohio, 
these permits are issued by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio 
                                                          
may be on the rise. HABs are a national concern because they affect not only the health of 
people and marine ecosystems, but also the ‘health’ of local and regional economies.”). 
 19  Lee, supra note 12. 
 20  Kilbert et al., supra note 11, at 70 (citing JEFFREY M. REUTTER ET AL., LAKE ERIE 
NUTRIENT LOADING AND HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND MANAGEMENT 
IMPLICATIONS 2 (2011)). 
 21  See Nutrient Loading, ENVTL. LITERACY COUNCIL, 
https://enviroliteracy.org/ecosystems/drivers-of-biodiversity-loss/nutrient-loading/ (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2019) (“Although nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur cycle naturally throughout the 
environment, an increase in levels of these particular pollutants, due to human activity, are 
occurring at concentrations which can put species at risk. Much of the increase is a result of 
various agricultural, industrial, and urban activities[.]”). It is also sometimes referred to as 
“nutrient pollution.” See What Is Nutrient Pollution?, NATL. OCEAN SERV., NATL. OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMM., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/nutpollution.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Nutrient pollution is the process where too many nutrients, mainly 
nitrogen and phosphorus, are added to bodies of water and can act like fertilizer, causing 
excessive growth of algae.”). 
 22  Kilbert et al., supra note 11, at 72 (citing OHIO EPA, OHIO LAKE ERIE PHOSPHORUS TASK 
FORCE FINAL REPORT 11, at 73 (2010)); see also Christina Dierkes, Ohio Phosphorus Task 
Force Releases Updated Report, Recommendations, OHIO SEA GRANT (Nov. 13, 2013), 
https://ohioseagrant.osu.edu/news/2013/002a7/ohio-phosphorus-task-force-releases-updated-
report (discussing updated report by Ohio Lake Erie Phosphorus Task Force II, issued in 2013); 
OHIO EPA ET AL., OHIO LAKE ERIE PHOSPHORUS TASK FORCE II FINAL REPORT (2013), 
http://lakeerie.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Reports/Task_Force_Report_October_2013.pdf. 
 23  See Jan Larson McLaughlin, Group Says Political Corruption, Not Algae Is Hurting Lake 
Erie, BG INDEP. NEWS (June 8, 2017), http://bgindependentmedia.org/group-says-political-
corruption-not-algae-is-hurting-lake-erie/. 
 24  Animal Feeding Operations (AFO) and Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFO), NAT’L RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/ (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 25  40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a) (2019). 
 26  33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2017). 
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EPA”).27 In 2002, after growing pressure from agriculture lobbyists,28 Ohio passed 
legislation to transfer the authority to issue discharge permits to CAFOs from the Ohio 
EPA to the Ohio Department of Agriculture (“ODA”).29 To date, the U.S. EPA has 
not approved this transfer,30 as required by federal regulation.31 ODA’s request for 
authorization remains pending.32 ODA and the U.S. EPA have corresponded on 
several occasions since the Ohio legislation passed, with ODA repeatedly reiterating 
its request, and the U.S. EPA demanding legislative and regulatory changes before it 
will grant ODA authority.33 As the federal and state agencies have squabbled, 
                                                          
 27  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08 (LexisNexis 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 6111.03(R)(2) (LexisNexis 2017) (“[Powers of director of environmental protection] . . . This 
chapter authorizes the state to participate in . . . the national pollutant discharge elimination 
system . . . in accordance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”). 
 28  Mike Wagner & Ben Sutherly, The Supersizing of America’s Livestock Farms, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2002, at A1; see also ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, GIVING AWAY THE 
FARM: WHY U.S. EPA SHOULD REJECT THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S BID TO 
ADMINISTER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 28 (Oct. 2006). 
 29  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08. 
 30  Id.; Region 5 Water, Ohio CAFO Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www3.epa.gov/region5/water/npdestek/odacafo.htm (last updated Feb. 22, 2016). 
 31  40 C.F.R. § 123.62(c) (“States with approved programs must notify the EPA whenever 
they propose to transfer all or part of any program from the approved State agency to any other 
State agency, and must identify any new division of responsibilities among the agencies 
involved. The new agency is not authorized to administer the program until approved by the 
Administrator under paragraph (b) [procedures for revision of a State program] of this 
section.”). 
 32  Region 5 Water, supra note 30. 
 33  Letter from Bob Taft, Governor, State of Ohio to Mary A. Gade, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. EPA, 
Region 5 (Dec. 28, 2006), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
04/documents/oda_applicationw_bookmarks_0.pdf (submitting for approval application to 
transfer authority from Ohio EPA to ODA); Letter from Jo Lynn Traub, Dir., Water Division, 
U.S. EPA, Region 5 to Robert J. Boggs, Director, Ohio Department of Agriculture (Apr. 4, 
2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
04/documents/epaapril2007lettertooda.pdf (addressing initial list of questions and concerns 
regarding land application and wastewater issues in Ohio’s application); Letter from Robert J. 
Boggs, Dir., ODA to Jo Lynn Traub, Dir., Water Division, U.S. EPA, Region 5 (June 22, 2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-04/documents/oda-62207-ltr_0.pdf 
(addressing manure land application issues); Letter from Robert D. Tolpa, Acting Dir., Water 
Division, U.S. EPA, Region 5 to Robert J. Boggs, Dir., ODA (Nov. 8, 2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-04/documents/epanov2007ltrtooda_0.pdf 
(requesting clarifications and revisions to portions of Ohio’s application); Letter from Robert J. 
Boggs, Dir., ODA to Lynn Buhl, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. EPA, Region 5 (Sept. 4, 2008), 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/www3/region5/water/npdestek/ODA/ODASept4ltrtoE
PApart1.pdf (providing proposed revisions to Ohio’s regulations and statutes to address 
concerns identified in EPA’s April and November 2007 letters); Letter from Kevin Elder, Exec. 
Dir., ODA to Lynn Buhl, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. EPA, Region 5 (Sept. 22, 2008), 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/www3/region5/water/npdestek/ODA/ODASept22ltrst
oEPA.pdf (providing corrections to enclosure sent with September 4, 2008 letter); Letter from 
Lynn Buhl, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. EPA, Region 5 to Robert J. Boggs, Dir., Ohio Dep’t. of Agric. 
(Oct. 3, 2008), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/www3/region5/water/npdestek/ODA/O
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concerned citizens and organizations have urged the U.S. EPA to deny this transfer, 
citing ODA’s enforcement failures and corrupt practices in the regulation of CAFOs.34 
This Note analyzes ODA’s request and concludes that the U.S. EPA should not 
grant ODA the authority to issue discharge permits for CAFOs due to ODA’s 
inadequate statutory authority, its insufficient regulations, and the regulatory capture 
of the agency. Part II of this Note discusses CAFOs, the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) of the Clean Water Act, and the legislative and 
political events in Ohio concerning the NPDES program for CAFOs. Part III illustrates 
the legislative, regulatory, and public interest conflicts raised by ODA’s request for 
permitting authority. Finally, Part IV recommends an option that will satisfy the 
federal requirements of the NPDES program and best manage phosphorus loading into 
Lake Erie and other bodies of water in Ohio. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Rise of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
In recent decades, livestock farming in the United States has morphed into an 
unprecedented industry as production has shifted from small, family owned farms to 
large, corporate-owned facilities.35 Due to the efficiency of industrial farming, “since 
1960, milk production has doubled, meat production has tripled, and egg production 
has quadrupled.”36 This growth is largely a result of “[n]ew technologies [that] have 
allowed farmers to reduce costs, which means bigger profits on less land and capital. 
The current agricultural system rewards larger farms with lower costs, which results 
in greater profit and more incentive to increase farm size.”37 As this system of 
                                                          
H%20CAFO%20Boggs%20Oct%202008.pdf (informing ODA that its request is approvable, 
provided that revisions in the ODA’s September 4, 2008 letter are adopted). 
 34  Transcript of Public Hearing on Ohio Department of Agriculture’s Clean Water 
Program for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 14–16, 17–19, 22–24, 25–27, 46–52, 
57–66, 71–77, 78–81, 97–98 (Nov. 18, 2008), 
https://www3.epa.gov/region5/water/npdestek/ODA/ODA111808.pdf; Tom Henry, Advocates 
Assert Ohio Department of Agriculture Lacks Legal Authority, TOLEDO BLADE (June 7, 2017), 
http://www.toledoblade.com/frontpage/2017/06/07/toledo-based-advocates-ohio-department-
agriculture-issue-enforce-permits.html; Citizen’s Petition to the U.S. EPA for Withdrawal of the 
CAFO National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program Delegation as well as the 
CAFO Permits to Install and Operate from the State of Ohio (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with author); 
McLaughlin, supra note 23. 
 35  CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING 
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 1 (Mark 
Schultz ed., 2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/8
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industrial farming grew in the mid-twentieth century,38 federal agencies began to 
regulate the conglomerates, codifying them with the name “CAFOs.”39 
CAFOs are “large concentrated AFOs,”40 with the U.S. EPA defining AFOs as 
“agricultural enterprises where animals are kept and raised in confined situations.” 
“AFOs congregate animals, feed, manure and urine, dead animals, and production 
operations on a small land area.”41 To be considered a CAFO, an AFO must have 
“more than 1,000 animal units (an animal unit is defined as an animal equivalent of 
1,000 pounds live weight).”42 To put this in perspective, under the federal definitions 
a facility is considered a CAFO when it has the “equivalent of 1,000 head of beef 
cattle, 700 dairy cows, 2,500 swine weighing more than 55 lbs[.], 125 thousand broiler 
chickens, or 82 thousand laying hens[.]”43 
While the CAFO model of livestock farming comes with considerable benefits,44 
such as inexpensively feeding a growing population,45 it also comes with significant 
                                                          
 38  Carolyn Dimitri et al., The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture & Farm 
Policy, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (2005), 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/59390/2/eib3.pdf. 
 39  CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33656, ANIMAL WASTE AND WATER 
QUALITY: EPA’S RESPONSE TO THE WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE COURT DECISION ON REGULATION 
OF CAFOS 3 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33656.pdf. 
 40  NAT’L RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., supra note 24. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  HRIBAR, supra note 35, at 2 (“When properly managed, located, and monitored, CAFOs 
can provide a low-cost source of meat, milk, and eggs, due to efficient feeding and housing of 
animals, increased facility size, and animal specialization. When CAFOs are proposed in a local 
area, it is usually argued that they will enhance the local economy and increase employment. 
The effects of using local materials, feed, and livestock are argued to ripple throughout the 
economy, and increased tax expenditures will lead to increase[d] funds for schools and 
infrastructure.”). 
 45  Id.; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, A LOOK AT THE 1940 CENSUS 4 (2010), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/1940census/CSPAN_1940slides.pdf (showing 
growth in the United States population each year a census had been taken from 1940 to 2010, 
with continued growth projections through 2050). 
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consequences.46 CAFOs create air pollution,47 contribute significantly to global 
greenhouse gas emissions,48 and are thought to be a leading cause for the development 
of antibiotic resistant illnesses.49 
Out of the many concerns tied to the operation of CAFOs, “[t]he most pressing 
public health issue . . . stems from the amount of manure they produce.”50 It is 
estimated that livestock animals in the U.S. produce as much as 1.2–1.37 billion tons 
of waste annually.51 The problem with such a staggering amount of animal waste is 
that there is simply nothing to do with all of it.52 While some manure can effectively 
be used for fertilizer,53 the amount of waste produced by CAFOs far exceeds the 
amount that can be applied to the ground.54 When manure is over-applied, “nutrients 
overwhelm the absorptive capacity of the soil, and either run off or are leached into 
                                                          
 46  Michael Greger & Gowri Koneswaran, The Public Health Impacts of Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations on Local Communities, 33 FAM. & COMMUNITY HEALTH 373 (2010) 
(“[CAFOs] release a significant amount of contaminants into the air and water. Adverse health 
effects related to exposure to these contaminants among CAFO workers have been well-
documented; however, less is known about their impact on the health of residents in nearby 
communities. Epidemiological research in this area suggests that neighboring residents are at 
increased risk of developing neurobehavioral symptoms and respiratory illnesses, including 
asthma.”); HRIBAR, supra note 35, at 7 (“Aside from the possibility of lowering air quality in 
the areas around them, CAFOs also emit greenhouse gases, and therefore contribute to climate 
change.”); ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 28, at 4–5 (“[Potential groundwater 
contamination by CAFOs] poses serious risks to human health. More than 150 pathogens found 
in livestock manure are associated with risks to humans, including the six human pathogens that 
account for more than 90 percent of food and waterborne diseases in humans. Manure-related 
microbes in water can cause severe gastrointestinal disease, complications and even death.”); 
Scott Weathers & Sophie Hermanns, Open Letter on Industrial Animal Farming: To the 
Candidates for the Position of Director-General of the World Health Organization, OPEN 
LETTER ON INDUS. ANIMAL FARMING, https://openletteranimalfarming.com/welcome/ (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (“Practices such as the constant low dosing of antibiotics an 
environmental pollution through animal waste make industrial animal farms the perfect 
breeding ground for antibiotic resistance by allowing transmission into the environment and 
nearby community. Several studies have found that the presence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
in livestock is closely associated with their presence in humans, and that decreases in antibiotic 
resistance have followed reductions in the usage of antibiotics in animals raised for food and 
humans.”). 
 47  HRIBAR, supra note 35, at 5. 
 48  Id. at 7. 
 49  Id. at 10. 
 50  Id. at 2 (“CAFOs manure contains a variety of potential contaminants. It can contain 
plant nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus, pathogens such as E. coli, growth hormones, 
antibiotics, chemicals used as additives to the manure or to clean equipment, animal blood, 
silage leachate from corn feed, or copper sulfate used in footbaths for cows.”). 
 51  Id. at 2. 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id. 
 54  Id.; Greger & Koneswaran, supra note 46, at 374. 
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the groundwater.”55 In Ohio alone, CAFOs generate over ten million tons of manure 
every year, with “some individual facilities creating more waste than medium-sized 
cities.”56 
B. The Clean Water Act and the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
The principal federal legislation for regulating water pollution in the United States 
is the Clean Water Act of 1972, which governs the discharge of pollutants into surface 
waters of the United States.57 Congress stated the objective of the Clean Water Act as 
“the restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters.”58 The Clean Water Act applies to any discharge of a pollutant 
from a point source59 into the navigable waters of the United States.60 The Clean Water 
Act broadly defines “pollutant” to include various kinds of waste, including 
“agricultural waste discharged into water.”61 The legislation defines “discharge,” in 
pertinent part, as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”62 
The heart of the Clean Water Act is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (“NPDES”) program, which promulgates standards for issuing permits for the 
discharge of pollutants.63 The NPDES program is defined as “the national program for 
issuing, modifying, revoking, and reissuing, terminating, monitoring, and enforcing 
permits, and imposing and enforcing pretreatment requirements [under the Clean 
                                                          
 55  HRIBAR, supra note 35, at 3. 
 56  ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 28, at v. 
 57  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); see also History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2017). 
 58  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 59  Id. § 1362(14) (defining “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete 
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other 
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”). 
 60  See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 57. 
 61  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (stating “[t]he term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, 
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological 
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt 
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term does not mean 
(A) ‘sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel of the 
Armed Forces’ within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other 
material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in 
association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to 
facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the State in which the 
well is located, and if such State determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the 
degradation of ground or surface water resources.”). 
 62  Id. § 1362(12). Legislative history indicates that the term “navigable waters” is meant to 
be broadly defined. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.) (stating “conferees fully 
intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation . . . .”); see also 118 CONG. REC. 33,757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell) 
(remarking that the definition “clearly encompasses all water bodies, including streams and their 
tributaries, for water quality purposes.”). 
 63  33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)–(5). 
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Water Act].”64 Discharging pollutants into waters of the United States without a 
permit, or contrary to the conditions of a permit, is illegal under the Clean Water Act.65 
A pertinent feature of the NPDES program is the ability for states to administer 
state permit programs.66 The NPDES provision states that “the Governor of each State 
desiring to administer its own permit program . . . may submit to the Administrator [of 
the U.S. EPA] a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish 
and administer under State law.”67 The provision further states that the U.S. EPA 
Administrator will approve state programs “unless he determines that adequate 
authority does not exist” to implement the state NPDES program in compliance with 
the Clean Water Act.68 If a state wishes to alter to its permit program, it must resubmit 
for approval from the Administrator and follow federal procedures for program 
revisions.69 In accordance with these federal standards, the U.S. EPA approved the 
State of Ohio to implement the NPDES program in 1974, with enforcement authority 
delegated to the Ohio EPA.70 
C. Ohio Senate Bill 141 
In the 1990s, as industrial livestock farming grew substantially in Ohio,71 factory 
farms gained political influence.72 Lobbyists pushed for the transfer of regulatory 
authority over CAFOs to ODA.73 This resulted in Ohio enacting Senate Bill 141,74 
which sought to give ODA the authority to regulate environmental permitting for 
CAFOs.75 The framework of Senate Bill 141 consisted of three separate permits for 
CAFOs: (1) permits to install; (2) permits to operate; and (3) permits to discharge 
pollutants under the federal NPDES program.76 Because NPDES permits are part of 
                                                          
 64  40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2019).  
 65  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (stating “except as in compliance with this section [and others, 
including the national pollutant discharge elimination system], the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person shall be unlawful.”). 
 66  Id. § 1342(b). 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at (1)–(9). 
 69  40 C.F.R. § 123.62(b). 
 70  U.S. EPA, PERMITTING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS (PER), NPEDES PROFILE: OHIO 
(2005), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/ohio_final_profile.pdf. 
 71  ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 28, at 1 (stating “[t]he number of CAFOs in 
[Ohio] more than tripled during the 1990s.”). 
 72  See Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio Farm Bureau Keeps Agribusiness at Forefront, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 2, 2002, at A6 (discussing the political influence of the lobbying group Ohio 
Farm Bureau, which has used its power to minimize regulations on farming). 
 73  Id.; Wagner & Sutherly, supra note 28. 
 74  Bischoff, supra note 72, at A6 (stating “[a]fter years of work, the agriculture industry 
persuaded the Ohio General Assembly and Gov. Bob Taft to shift regulation of large-scale 
animal farms from the Ohio EPA to the state Department of Agriculture.”). 
 75  S.B. 141, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000). 
 76  Id. 
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the Clean Water Act, transferring authority to issue them required approval by the U.S. 
EPA.77 Ohio Senate Bill 141 was enacted in 2000,78 yet the U.S. EPA had not approved 
ODA to regulate NPDES permits for CAFOs.79 Although lacking NPDES permitting 
authority, ODA assumed authority to issue permits to install and permits to operate 
CAFOs in 2002.80 
D. Subsequent Efforts to Transfer Authority to ODA 
In 2006, Ohio Governor Bob Taft submitted ODA’s CAFO program to the U.S. 
EPA for formal approval.81 In his letter to the U.S. EPA, Governor Taft expressed 
confidence that “ODA possesse[d] adequate authority to implement the proposed 
NPDES program, in accordance with the [Clean Water Act].”82 In its response, the 
U.S. EPA expressed several concerns regarding land application of manure and 
wastewater issues in Ohio’s plan that did not meet federal standards.83 In expressing 
one such concern, the U.S. EPA stated its apprehension over Ohio’s planned 
allowance for manure application, noting that it “will not minimize phosphorus 
movement to surface waters as required under [the Clean Water Act].”84 In a later 
letter to ODA, the U.S. EPA expressed additional concerns, including that ODA did 
not appear to have the statutory authority necessary “to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants beyond those within the definition of manure and storm water, such as might 
be introduced from a co-located facility, or into a CAFO from a commercial or 
industrial source (e.g., a food processor).”85 The U.S. EPA’s letter concluded, “these 
initial concerns must be resolved, or they may prevent [approval of] the revised 
program.”86 
E. Notice of Proposed Approval and Public Comments 
On October 15, 2008, a Federal Register notice proposed to approve Ohio’s 
application to transfer the NPDES program for CAFOs to ODA.87 A public hearing 
on ODA’s Clean Water Program for CAFOs was held on November 18, 2008, in 
Columbus, Ohio.88 Comments at the hearing came from many different perspectives, 
                                                          
 77  40 C.F.R. § 123.62 (2019) (detailing procedures for revision of state programs). 
 78  Ohio S.B. 141. 
 79  Region 5 Water, supra note 30. 
 80  ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 28, at 2; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 903.02, 903.03 
(LexisNexis 2017). 
 81  Letter from Bob Taft to Mary Gade, supra note 33. 
 82  Id.  
 83  Letter from Jo Lynn Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Letter from Robert Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 86  Id. 
 87  State Program Requirements; Application to Administer the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs); Ohio, 73 Fed. Reg. 61123 (proposed Oct. 15, 2008).  
 88  Transcript of Public Hearing, supra note 34, at 1. 
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including: local farmers; environmental activists; families living near CAFOs; and 
ODA itself.89 
Comments in support of transferring authority to ODA90 included claims that ODA 
demonstrated a “responsible manner in which [it] . . . responds to complaints”91 and 
that federal rules for CAFOs are “not as stringent as ODA’s rules are under Ohio’s 
livestock permitting authority.”92 There were two prominent themes that emerged in 
supportive comments: (1) “farmers do not want to be overregulated with the burden 
of having people breathing down [their] neck[s] over regulations”;93 and (2) “ODA 
already has a working relationship with farmers.”94 
Opposition to the transfer of authority came from many interested parties.95 One 
such commenter claimed that “[t]he ODA has not seriously attempted to enforce its 
existing permit program.”96 It has not staffed itself in a manner adequate for 
enforcement, and it does not have the political independence or the enforcement 
mentality equal to countering the environmental threat posed by modern industrial-
scale agriculture.”97 Further criticism of ODA included that the agency had done 
“minimal enforcement work that consists almost entirely of merely notifying 
companies of their violations, with no effort to seek effective sanctions.”98 
                                                          
 89  Id. at 8. 
 90  Commenters that supported the transfer were mostly farmers and dairy and livestock 
producers, with such parties constituting 17 out of the 24 comments in support of the transfer. 
Id. at 19, 32, 35, 38–39, 44, 52, 55, 70, 78, 83–84, 88, 92, 94. The remaining commenters in 
support were mostly organizations and professionals having direct business ties to farmers: this 
included Ohio Farm Bureau Federation; a CAFO consultant; Ohio Pork Producers Council; a 
food animal veterinarian; and Ohio Cattlemen’s Association. Id. at 19, 29, 37, 41, 94. There was 
one commenter out of the 23 in support of the transfer who did not express economic affiliation 
with the agriculture industry. Id. at 77–78. 
 91  Id. at 22. 
 92  Id. at 30. 
 93  Id. at 28, 30, 40–41, 45, 70, 92–93. 
 94  Id. at 28, 37–38, 42, 83. 
 95  Commenters that opposed the transfer included a number of private citizens, as well as 
representatives from Ohio Coastal Resource Management Group, Ohio Environmental Council, 
Acre (a grassroots group), the League of Women Voters of Perrysburg, and the Ohio Chapter 
of the Sierra Club. Id. at 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 27–28, 30, 36, 48, 57, 59, 63, 69, 73, 77–78, 91, 97–
98. There were a total of 14 comments opposing the transfer. Id. 
 96  The commenter is referring to permits to install and permits to operate that are issued by 
ODA to CAFOs. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 903.02, 903.03 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 97  Transcript of Public Hearing, supra note 34, at 63. 
 98  Id. at 64. 
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F. Current State of Ohio’s Request 
The U.S. EPA did not go through with a final rule approving Ohio’s 2006 request 
to transfer authority to ODA to issue NPDES permits for CAFOs.99 Since the 2006 
request, the U.S. EPA has met Ohio with more requests for revisions and ODA has 
initiated further attempts at gaining approval.100 The U.S. EPA’s website states: 
EPA’s final decision on Ohio’s request will be based on a determination of 
whether ODA has the legal authority, as well as the ability and resources, 
to administer the NPDES program for CAFOs, consistent with the Clean 
Water Act . . . . Our decision will also be based on comments that EPA has 
received on the proposal.101 
III. ODA LACKS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY, REGULATORY PLANS, AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST PROTECTIONS NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY REGULATE NPDES 
PERMITTING FOR CAFOS 
A. ODA’s Statutory Authority 
Ohio’s legislation to transfer authority to ODA to regulate permits for CAFOs 
raises several concerns that were addressed by the U.S. EPA in letters to ODA.102 This 
section focuses on three of these legislative weaknesses: (1) the legislation does not 
give ODA authority to regulate all pollutants; (2) ODA attempts to consider “technical 
feasibility” of effluent limitations, which federal law does not permit; and (3) ODA’s 
conflict of interest provision is not as stringent as federal standards. 
1. ODA Does Not Have the Statutory Authority to Regulate All Pollutants 
One concern regarding ODA’s statutory authority is that ODA does not have the 
authority to regulate all pollutants.103 The term “pollutants” is defined by the Clean 
Water Act to encompass a wide range of organic and inorganic materials.104 ODA’s 
regulations claim to authorize ODA’s director to regulate “pollutants,” however, 
ODA’s statutory authority under Ohio law appears to be limited to the regulation of 
manure, CAFO-related process/process-generated wastewater, and storm water.105 
Consequently, ODA is not authorized to regulate the full range of potential pollutants 
that may arise in the operation of a CAFO. In its comments to Ohio regarding this 
deficiency, the U.S. EPA noted, “Ohio will need to revise ODA’s authority to enable 
                                                          
 99  See Peggy Kirk Hall, Couple Challenges Ohio’s Transfer of CAFO NPDES Permit 
Authority in Federal Court, OHIO ST. U. C. FOOD, AGRIC., & ENVTL. SCI. (Aug. 8, 2014), 
https://farmoffice.osu.edu/blog-tags/cafo-permits. 
 100  See Letter from Robert Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33; Letter from Jo Lynn 
Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 101  See Region 5 Water, supra note 30. 
 102  See Letter from Jo Lynn Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 103  Letter from Robert Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 104  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012). 
 105  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08 (LexisNexis 2017). 
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ODA to address such situations, or specify the State’s current authority to do so.”106 
The legislation has not been modified to address this discrepancy.107 
The Clean Water Act states the Administrator shall approve state programs, 
“unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist to issue permits which 
apply, and ensure compliance with, any applicable requirements” of the Act.108 The 
ODA’s lack of authority to regulate the full range of pollutants controlled by the Clean 
Water Act shows that ODA’s authority falls short. The U.S. EPA should find that 
ODA does not have sufficient legal authority to regulate NPDES permitting for 
CAFOs. 
2. ODA Improperly Attempts to Consider “Technical Feasibility” of Effluent 
Limitations 
Another concern regarding ODA’s statutory authority is that the Ohio legislation 
improperly allows the Director of ODA to consider the “technical feasibility” of 
effluent limitations. “Effluent limitations” are restrictions on quantities, rates, and 
concentrations of pollution.109 The Ohio legislation states, “[the Director of ODA] 
shall consider technical feasibility and economic costs and shall allow a reasonable 
period of time for coming into compliance with the permit.”110 In an attachment to its 
November 2007 letter to ODA, the U.S. EPA explains that considering the “technical 
feasibility” of effluent limitations is not a feature of the NPDES program delegated to 
the states.111 This aspect of the program is controlled by federal standards that already 
                                                          
 106  Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 107  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08(A)(2) (stating “[o]n or after the date on which the United 
States environmental protection agency approves the state program submitted under division 
(A)(1) of this section, the authority to enforce terms and conditions of NPDES permits 
previously issued under division (J) of section 6111.03 or under section 6111.035 of the Revised 
Code for the discharging, transporting, or handling of storm water from an animal feeding 
facility or of pollutants from concentrated animal feeding operations is transferred from the 
director of environmental protection to the director of agriculture.” As U.S. EPA noted in its 
correspondence with the ODA, it appears “ODA does not appear to have the statutory authority 
to regulate the discharge of pollutants beyond those within the definition of manure and storm 
water, such as might be introduced from a co-located facility, or into a CAFO from a 
commercial or industrial source (e.g., a food processor).”; Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to Robert 
J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 108  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
 109  See Hannah Connor, Lawsuit Fights Trump’s Delay of Lifesaving Limits on Coal-plant 
Water Pollution, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2018/coal-plant-water-pollution-01-
30-2018.php. 
 110  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08(G). 
 111  Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33 (stating “[f]or Large 
CAFOs, EPA already accounted for technical feasibility and economic costs when it developed 
the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the CAFO 
Point Source Category, and except for limited opportunities for variances from technology-
based standards, ODA would not be able to consider these factors further in establishing effluent 
limitations.”). 
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account for “technical feasibility” and economic costs.112 The U.S. EPA stated, “ODA 
would not be able to consider these factors further in establishing effluent 
limitations.”113  
The Ohio legislation seeks to allow ODA to issue permits that may not apply the 
Clean Water Act’s effluent limitation standards, which are required by federal law.114 
The Clean Water Act establishes that “[t]he Administrator shall approve each [state] 
program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist . . . to issue 
permits, which apply, and ensure compliance with . . . [the Clean Water Act’s effluent 
limitations].”115 ODA improperly asserting authority to consider effluent limitations, 
outside of those promulgated by the Clean Water Act, is another reason the U.S. EPA 
should not transfer NPDES permitting authority to ODA. 
3. ODA’s Conflict of Interest Provision Does Not Meet Federal Standards 
ODA’s statutory authority raises an additional concern, in that its conflict of 
interest provision does not meet federal standards.116 The Ohio Revised Code provides 
that no person may approve, nor be on a board that approves, NPDES permits if having 
received “a significant portion of income from any NPDES permittee or any applicant 
for a NPDES permit” during the past two years.117 While this provision nearly matches 
the federal standard, slight differences in the language of Ohio’s provision create a 
large discrepancy.118 The federal provision states that no person may approve, nor be 
on a board that approves, NPDES permits if having received “a significant portion of 
income directly or indirectly from permit holders or applicants” during the past two 
years.119 Ohio’s provision omitting “directly or indirectly” may seem like a small 
alteration, but removing these words changes the implication of the law.  
State permit programs “must be administered in conformance with” the federal 
conflict of interest provision.120 Ohio’s less stringent conflict of interest provision 
clouds the federal law’s intent to be all encompassing. This opens the door to potential 
abuses. For example, a permitting authority may construe an “indirect” source of 
income from a permittee as inconsequential under Ohio law, though it would clearly 
create a conflict of interest under federal law. Ohio’s conflict of interest provision is 
not in conformance with federal law, providing yet another indication that the U.S. 
EPA should not grant ODA permitting authority. 
                                                          
 112  33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (stating “[i]n order to carry out [objectives of the Clean Water 
Act] there shall be achieved . . . effluent limitations for point sources . . . which shall require the 
application of best practicable control technology currently available as defined by the 
Administrator [of the U.S. EPA].”). 
 113  Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 114  Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
 115  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (stating that state permit programs must apply and insure 
compliance with Clean Water Act effluent limitations). 
 116  See Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 117  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.081(A) (LexisNexis 2017). 
 118  Id.; Requirements for Permitting, 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(c) (2018). 
 119  40 C.F.R. § 123.25(c). 
 120  Id. § 123.25(a). 
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B. ODA’s Regulations 
In its 2007 letter to ODA, the U.S. EPA expressed several concerns regarding 
ODA’s program for the land applications of manure.121 Among these was the concern 
that ODA’s program “does not contain a setback applicable to manure application near 
downgradient structures,”122 which is required by the federal regulations.123 Setback 
provisions are designed to prevent runoff from the application of manure from 
reaching bodies of water.124 ODA’s standards for setbacks near downgradient 
structures have yet to be altered to comply with the federal regulations.125 
Another major concern the U.S. EPA expressed was that ODA’s plan implemented 
improper methods for applying manure on snow or frozen land.126 The U.S. EPA 
stated, “[EPA] is concerned that ODA technical standards will not minimize 
movement of nutrients to waters of the United States as required by [the Code of 
Federal Regulations].”127 These are just two examples of several issues the U.S. EPA 
raised, concerning ODA’s standards for the land application of manure.128 Because 
ODA’s plan for the land application of manure does not ensure compliance with 
federal regulations, the U.S. EPA should deny ODA’s request for NPDES permitting 
authority. 
C. The Regulatory Capture of ODA 
A frequent theme in the 2008 public hearing on ODA’s request for NPDES 
permitting authority was the notion that ODA has a good rapport with farmers.129 
Several Ohio farmers gave emphatic support for ODA’s request, citing their positive 
                                                          
 121  Letter from Jo Lynn Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 122  Id. 
 123  40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(5) (stating that CAFOs may not apply manure, litter, or process 
wastewater “closer than 100 feet to any down-gradient surface waters, open tile line intake 
structures, sinkholes, agricultural well heads, or other conduits to surface waters.”). 
 124  See id. § 412.4(b)(1) (defining setback as “a specified distance from surface waters or 
potential conduits to surface waters where manure, litter, and process wastewater may not be 
land applied. Examples of conduits to surface waters include but are not limited to: Open tile 
line intake structures, sinkholes, and agricultural well heads.”). 
 125  OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 901:10-2-14(C)(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (stating “[a]ll land 
applications of manure shall comply with all restrictions contained in appendix A to this rule 
unless a compliance alternative is submitted and approved by the director . . . as a compliance 
alternative, the concentrated animal feeding operation . . . may demonstrate . . . [that] a 
soil . . . not prone to flooding in a particular county in which land applications of manure are 
planned . . . .”). This section makes no mention of “any down-gradient surface waters,” as 
specified in the federal regulation. § 412.4(c)(5). 
 126  Letter from Jo Lynn Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 127  Letter from Robert Tolpa to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33. 
 128  The enclosure to the April 4, 2007 letter also mentions concerns regarding “application 
of manure in excess of crop nutrient requirements” and “precipitation-related discharges when 
it rain is forecast to occur within 24 hours after an intended manure application event.” Letter 
from Jo Lynn Traub to Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33, at 4. 
 129  See Transcript of Public Hearing, supra note 34, at 28. 
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relationship with ODA as a reason the U.S. EPA should give its approval.130 While it 
is understandable that farmers want to get along with the agency regulating their 
livelihood, this argument should not outweigh the serious concerns arising from ODA 
manifesting regulatory capture. 
1. Defining Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture occurs when “[a] regulator . . . is in a constant state of ‘being 
persuaded’: persuaded based on a persuader’s identity rather than an argument’s 
merits.”131 This form of government failure is “evidenced by a body of commission 
decisions or non-decisions—about resources, procedures, priorities, and policies, 
where what the regulated entity wants has more influence than what the public interest 
requires.”132 A common source of regulatory capture is the influence of lobbyists and 
interest groups, which lead to agencies being governed by individuals that are strongly 
influenced by, or are members of, the regulated industry.133 
ODA has been criticized for its blatant capture by the agriculture industry.134 Many 
of the individuals with leadership positions within ODA are lifelong farmers from 
farming families.135 The director of ODA, David Daniels, is a farmer whose family 
has owned a 187-acre farm since the 1800s.136 The assistant director, Tim Derickson, 
                                                          
 130  Id. at 28, 37–38, 42, 83. 
 131  Scott Hempling, “Regulatory Capture”: Sources and Solutions, 1 EMORY CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 23, 25 (2014); see also Nicholas Bagley, Agency 
Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (defining capture as a “shorthand for the phenomenon 
whereby regulated entities wield their superior organizational capacities to secure favorable 
agency outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public.”). 
 132  Hempling, supra note 131, at 25. 
 133  Id. at 28; see also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public 
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 L.J. ECON. & ORG. 167, 178 (1990) 
(explaining capture as “the adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such 
as enhancing electoral support or postregulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be 
ratified by an informed polity free of organization costs.”). 
 134  See Transcript to Public Hearing, supra note 34, at 64. 
 135  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 903.08 (LexisNexis 2017); Letter from Robert D. Tolpa to 
Robert J. Boggs, supra note 33; see also Biography of Mark Bruce, Communication, Divisions 
Leadership, OHIO DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, 
https://agri.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/oda/divisions/administration/divisions-leadership/person4 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019); Biography of Dr. Nick Wagner, Meat Inspection, Divisions 
Leadership, OHIO DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, http://www.agri.ohio.gov/divs/Leadership/ (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2019); Biography of Kirk Hines, Soil & Water Conservation, Divisions 
Leadership, OHIO DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, 
https://agri.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/oda/divisions/administration/divisions-leadership/kirk-
hines-bio (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 136  Gary Brock, Ag Director Daniels Thankful for Ohio Farm Community, SIDNEY DAILY 
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.sidneydailynews.com/news/agriculture/53896/ag-director-
daniels-thankful-for-ohio-farm-community. 
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is also a lifelong farmer.137 It is not difficult to conceive that administrators, who are 
members of the farming community, will empathize with disgruntled farmers who do 
not want stringent regulations disrupting their farming practices and complicating 
their compliance efforts. 
While it is not inherently corrupt for an agency to show concern for the community 
it regulates, issues arise when the regulating body has direct connections and interests 
tied to the regulated industry. This is where regulatory capture occurs, opening the 
door to ominous consequences. “Capture can have deleterious effects on the 
regulatory system by promoting unnecessary and inefficient rulemaking and also by 
impeding efficient regulation that serves the public interest.”138 In essence, the 
problems associated with regulatory capture can lead to a “government that fails to 
protect the public.”139 
Ties between agencies and the industries they regulate are easily spotted by simple 
observation, but claims of regulatory capture raise a significant problem: capture is 
very difficult to prove.140 Regulatory capture often becomes a diagnosis rooted in 
instinct, rather than evidence. These issues are addressed by Daniel Carpenter and 
David A. Moss in their volume devoted to the subject.141 Carpenter and Moss note that 
one of the problems with claims that are not tied strongly enough to evidence is that 
the reaction is often fatalism: “[o]bservers of regulation are often quicker to yelp about 
the evils of capture than to think hard about how it might be prevented or mitigated, 
short of wholesale deregulation.”142 Carpenter and Moss suggest that deregulation is 
not the answer143 and offer a model for diagnosing capture,144 as well as methods for 
preventing capture.145 
2. Carpenter and Moss’s Model for Diagnosing Regulatory Capture 
Carpenter and Moss offer a three-part analysis for finding capture. First, “[t]o 
claim capture, and argument ought to . . . provide a defeasible model of the public 
interest.”146 In finding public interest, the authors suggest looking to the “goal for 
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which the regulation was created,”147 and that the public interest is something 
“embodied in the people’s welfare.”148 
Here, the public interest goals to examine are those which the Clean Water Act 
and NPDES permit program were created to address. Ironically, the inspiration for the 
Clean Water Act was sparked by an infamous blunder that occurred just a mile south 
of Lake Erie: the Cuyahoga River catching fire in 1969.149 The incident on the 
Cuyahoga left a lasting impression and shifted national focus to the poor quality of the 
nation’s waters.150 In 1972, the Clean Water Act was born, with the goal of eliminating 
the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.151 Next, Carpenter and Moss state 
that a regulatory capture argument should “show a policy shift away from the public 
interest and toward industry (special) interest.”152 It is difficult to fully assess a policy 
shift under ODA, as ODA does not control NPDES permitting for CAFOs.153 
However, since 2002, ODA has controlled permits to operate and permits to install for 
CAFOs, while the Ohio EPA has continued to control NPDES permits for CAFOs.154 
A contrast in policy is illustrated by examining the manner in which the two agencies 
exercise their respective authority over CAFOs. 
In its 2006 report, the Environmental Integrity Project found a large discrepancy 
between ODA’s enforcement history and the Ohio EPA’s.155 The report found that 
“[a]s of July 31, 2006, ODA has engaged in 155 enforcement action, consisting of 64 
warning letters, 75 notices of deficiency, 10 notices of hearing, 1 emergency order, 
and 5 final orders. On three occasions, ODA assessed monetary penalties, which were 
in the amount of $200, $700, and $5,760.”156 In its assessment of these figures, the 
Environmental Integrity Project stated, “[w]ith only three penalties assessed in four 
years—two in the negligible amounts of $200 and $700—multi-million dollar 
operations have little incentive to address problems proactively.”157 The report 
discussed examples of CAFOs that have operated in violation of the Clean Water Act 
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for years by not obtaining a permit, with data showing that “ODA has done little to 
back up threats it issues near the end of warning letters and notices of deficiencies.”158 
The Environmental Integrity Project also examined the enforcement actions of the 
Ohio EPA, and while noting that the Ohio EPA has also “failed to keep pace with 
violators,”159 found that the Ohio EPA had “assessed double the number of penalties 
and in amounts averaging $16,786, or more than seven times ODA’s average 
penalty.”160 Additionally, in the first seventeen months after ODA had assumed 
permitting authority for permits to install and permits to operate, “ODA issued only 
eight enforcement actions, two of which originated with [the Ohio EPA’s] revocation 
of Buckeye Egg Farm’s permits.”161 In other words, one-fourth of the enforcement 
action ODA took was with the push of the Ohio EPA taking initial action. The report 
noted that “[a] similar lull in enforcement activity would pose far graver risks . . . [if 
there is] removal of [the Ohio EPA’s] remaining authority over CAFOs (a weakened 
safety net).”162 
The Environmental Integrity Project’s report supports a finding that ODA’s weak 
enforcement efforts against CAFOs manifest a policy shift away from the public 
interest and toward the industry interest. 
As insightful as it may be, the Environmental Integrity Project’s report is dated. A 
more recent study of the enforcement actions of the Ohio EPA and ODA would be 
more appropriate in analyzing each agency’s effectiveness in regulating CAFOs. 
However, such a study would prove immensely difficult to replicate. While the Ohio 
EPA maintains a database of records that is available to the public online,163 ODA 
maintains an archaic method of record storage to which the public has encumbered, 
limited access.164 
Examining the Ohio EPA’s recent records of enforcement actions requires nothing 
more than Internet access.165 The Ohio EPA maintains a database on which any 
member of the public can search for and examine various types of enforcement 
actions, including Notices of Violation, Warning Letters, Investigation Reports, and a 
number of other documents.166 A search for “Notice of Violation (NOV)” with the 
program category of “NPDES”, and keyword “farm,” displays hundreds of notices 
that have been issued to facilities for NPDES violations in recent years.167 
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By contrast, ODA’s website is devoid of any such online database.168 To make 
things more difficult, even if sought by public record request, ODA does not maintain 
any method of searching for data by enforcement action.169 Public record requests to 
ODA reveal that “ODA typically maintains all records related to concentrated animal 
feeding operations by facility rather than by topic.”170 Thus, if one were to attempt to 
compile statewide data on ODA’s enforcement relations with CAFOs, it would require 
individually requesting specific documents, one-by-one, from each of the hundreds of 
facilities in Ohio. 
When contacted by phone, Timothy Schirmer, counsel for ODA, was not able to 
suggest any better method of document retrieval.171 Mr. Schirmer confirmed that 
requests for information would have to be made by facility and by document type.172 
He further indicated that no compiled data could be found in ODA’s annual report.173 
When questioned as to the approximate amount of Notices of Violation that are issued 
to CAFOs per year by ODA, Mr. Schirmer stated that he did not know, but would have 
to guess that around ten to fifteen were issued per year.174 
There can be no question that the Ohio EPA demonstrates a higher degree of 
transparency than ODA in regard to enforcement actions against CAFOs. The Ohio 
EPA’s online database empowers citizens to examine actions taken by the Ohio EPA 
and to hold the agency accountable. ODA not only lacks an online database, but also 
lacks any semblance of comprehensive record keeping. Putting NPDES permitting 
authority for CAFOs into the hands of ODA would diminish accountability and 
transparency to the public. This is another manifestation of a policy shift away from 
the public interest.175 Transferring NPDES permitting authority to ODA would put 
Ohio citizens in the dark, while simultaneously increasing the ease with which 
industrial farms can keep their compliance failures hidden from public scrutiny, 
thereby shifting policy toward the industry interest.176 This is, of course, assuming 
ODA will even enforce NPDES compliance to begin with. 
Finally, Carpenter and Moss suggest that a regulatory capture argument must 
“show action and intent by the industry (special interest) in pursuit of this policy shift 
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sufficiently effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part of the shift.”177 The 
authors state that this can be demonstrated by lobbying efforts.178 
Agricultural lobbyists pushed for the legislation to transfer NPDES authority from 
the Ohio EPA to ODA in the late 1990s and early 2000s.179 As approval of the transfer 
remains pending, agricultural lobbyists continue to voice support for the transfer.180 In 
its 2017 annual meeting, The Ohio Farm Federation, a prominent political action 
committee, took position on the issue, stating: “We urge that members of Ohio’s 
congressional delegation and the Governor work to ensure that NPDES delegation 
authority for large livestock farms is transferred from the Ohio EPA to the Ohio 
Department of Agriculture.”181 In urging for the transfer, the group directly addressed 
Governor John Kasich, to whom the PAC made a campaign donation in 2016.182 
3. ODA’s Intent, or Lack Thereof, to Shift Policy 
Under Carpenter and Moss’s model for diagnosing regulatory capture, ODA does 
not escape scrutiny. However, ODA’s Director, David Daniels, has verbalized 
concerns for water quality,183 conflicting with an assessment that the agency is 
intending to shift policy away from public interest. 
When asked about ODA’s part in addressing water quality issues in Ohio, ODA 
Director David Daniels (“Director”) gave an assuring answer: “our producers and the 
ag community have stepped it up in a big way and want to work to find solutions to 
their contributions to the problems that are going on. We know that we have got a 
piece of this.”184 Presumably, the Director’s intentions to address the agricultural 
community’s “piece” of the water quality problem are sincere. However, his stated 
intentions do not diminish the underlying interests of the agriculture industry, and by 
direct connection, of the Director himself. No matter how subconscious the 
motivations may be, the Director, his friends, family, and close associates are likely 
to benefit from the convenience and financial benefits of less stringent regulations on 
farming. In an article discussing the regulatory capture of the banking industry, Steven 
Davidoff Solomon discusses the subtle way in which regulatory capture can manifest: 
“[a]mong these people, there is no evil or nefarious plot to regulate in favor of the 
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banks. These men and women may believe they are doing their best, but their 
worldview is affected by the people they interact with.”185 
Applying Solomon’s reasoning to ODA, the agency claiming that it has the 
public’s best interest in mind will not suffice to eliminate the influence the agriculture 
industry has on the agency’s leadership. The relationship between ODA and the 
agriculture industry may not display blatant conflicts of interest, “[b]ut the problem is 
that when you have regulators who are socially or ideologically captured, they may be 
unwilling to take more extreme steps with an industry or otherwise may act in subtle 
ways to affect it.”186 
4. Regulatory Capture and the Environmental Crises 
Regulatory capture is believed to “figure significantly in the major human and 
environmental crises of our time.”187 In Ohio, the environmental crisis facing Lake 
Erie and other surface waters in the state has caused growing concern over the power 
of the agricultural industry.188 Many people have spoken out against ODA’s request 
to regulate NPDES permitting for CAFOs in large part because of the strong ties 
between ODA and the agriculture industry.189 
ODA is a state agency that is unduly influenced by the interests of the agriculture 
industry; the very industry ODA wishes to watch over for water pollution. The 
concerns raised by ODA’s capture are exacerbated by ODA’s lack of a sufficient 
conflict of interest provision in the NPDES legislation, as discussed above.190 The 
regulatory capture of ODA illustrates that the agency will be unable to effectively 
administer the NPDES program for CAFOs. 
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IV. OHIO EPA IS A BETTER OPTION FOR REGULATING NPDES PERMITTING FOR 
CAFOS 
Carpenter and Moss discuss several possible ways to prevent regulatory capture.191 
Among these are the notion of diverse and independent expertise, which in essence 
finds that “ambiguous information and a lack of expertise combine to prevent even the 
most benevolent regulators from creating policies that advance public welfare.”192 
This concept illustrates the issue with ODA—even if there is no intent to work against 
the public welfare, and even if the agency has “stepped it up in a big way”193 to address 
water quality issues, the agency still has not demonstrated that it is a better option than 
the Ohio EPA for handling NPDES permits for CAFOs. 
The Ohio EPA’s Division of Surface Water “ensures compliance with the Clean 
Water Act and works to increase the number of water bodies that can safely be used 
for swimming and fishing.”194 The Division of Surface Water states that “the goal of 
Ohio’s surface water program—restoration and maintenance of Ohio’s water 
resources—reflects the national water quality objective in the Federal Clean Water 
Act (CWA), which is ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”195 The very mission of the division aligns with the 
objectives of the Clean Water Act.196 
The self-proclaimed mission statement of ODA is “to protect Ohio citizens by 
ensuring the safety of the state’s food supply, to maintain the health of Ohio’s animals 
and plant life, and to create economic opportunities for Ohio’s farmers, food 
processors and agribusinesses.”197 While commendable for including the health of 
Ohio’s animals and plant life, ODA’s mission statement notably lacks any mention of 
water quality.198 Examining ODA’s various divisions reveals that while ODA created 
its Division of Soil and Water Conservation in 2016, the new division of the agency 
does not mention the Clean Water Act or ensuring water quality.199 
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The Ohio EPA has been enforcing the Clean Water Act for over forty years200 and 
has a division devoted to surface water.201 Meanwhile, ODA’s Division of Soil and 
Water Conservation does not address the Clean Water Act.202 The significance of the 
agencies’ respective mission statements is illuminated by records showing the Ohio 
EPA takes enforcement actions against CAFOs for Clean Water Act violations at a 
much higher rate than ODA.203 The Ohio EPA has demonstrated a commitment to 
enforcing the Clean Water Act. Meanwhile, ODA has demonstrated that it “has not 
seriously attempted to enforce its existing permit program.”204 
V. CONCLUSION 
The growing number of harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie and other surface 
waters in Ohio makes the issue of controlling water pollution more pertinent than 
ever.205 The Clean Water Act is federal legislation designed to control water pollution, 
making it “unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a point source into navigable 
waters, unless a permit was obtained.”206 ODA does not have the statutory authority 
to regulate NPDES permitting for CAFOs that is required by the Clean Water Act.207 
Despite repeated requests by the U.S. EPA, and many years to resolve discrepancies, 
ODA has been unable to remedy their legislative shortcomings.208 The U.S. EPA has 
also instructed ODA to revise several of its regulations for CAFO permitting, a task 
which ODA has only partially completed.209 A state’s regulations must be as stringent 
as the federal standards of the NPDES program to meet the federal requirements for 
permitting.210 In addition to legislative and regulatory shortcomings, ODA also 
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exhibits regulatory capture.211 While regulatory capture is not illegal, analysts have 
pointed to its detrimental effect on regulatory schemes.212 
The Ohio EPA’s Division of Surface Water is designed for implementation of the 
Clean Water Act.213 The Ohio EPA has also demonstrated more serious enforcement 
efforts than ODA has regarding CAFOs.214 The transfer of authority to ODA would 
create an outlier in the state, as the Ohio EPA regulates NPDES permitting for all other 
industries.215 This attempted transfer is for the comfort and convenience of industrial 
farms and demonstrates no tangible public interest. 
The Clean Water Act provides that, if a state agency is unable to properly 
administer the NPDES program, then the Administrator should deny the agency the 
authority to do so.216 ODA has demonstrated that it does not have the requisite 
authority, plans, interests, or goals consistent with the Clean Water Act and the 
NPDES program. Allowing such a transfer would not only affect the regulatory 
success of the Clean Water Act, but also sets a dangerous precedent for Ohio. In the 
2008 public hearing concerning ODA’s request for permitting authority, a commenter 
from the Ohio Environmental Council poignantly stated: “there are other industries 
knocking at the door wanting to move permitting authority over water quality . . . to 
agencies that they work better with. I’m not sure if we all are ready for the domino 
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